To help define the challenge, TI worked on, Mapping the Risks of Corruption in Humanitarian Action, an extensive report that maps and analyses corruption risks in emergency relief operations.

Corruption in the delivery of relief undermines the very spirit of humanitarian assistance: to help those in greatest need, the victims of natural disaster and civil conflict. Relief supplies – including food, water, shelter and medicines - can, as a result of corruption, be diverted from those victims and into the pockets of the corrupt. The large influx of external resources, both financial and in kind, the urgency of delivering relief and reconstruction supplies coupled with the breakdown of local institutions and services exacerbate the risk of corruption in emergency situations.

The issue is a key concern for practitioners, who devote much energy to trying to minimise the risks of diversion. But it has barely been discussed in policy terms and little researched. Humanitarian workers have been reluctant to discuss corruption publicly because of fears that being open about its risks and extent might erode public support and threaten operational security or the ability to operate in a country. This silence, however, inhibits sharing of learning and good practice in minimising corruption.

From September 2005 to June 2006 TI concentrated on improving the diagnosis of corruption risks in humanitarian assistance programmes. Following an expert meeting with TI partners from the humanitarian community in late 2005, the Humanitarian Policy Group of the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) was contracted to develop a corruption risk map for humanitarian assistance. The report, Mapping the Risk of Corruption in Humanitarian Action, was prepared by the Humanitarian Policy Group and published jointly by TI, the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre of the Christian Michelsen Institute and the ODI.

This report looks at the entire humanitarian relief process, particularly as led by international humanitarian agencies, and tries to identifies:

• the points where relief is most vulnerable to corruption
• what kinds of corrupt practices could occur
• who would be involved

Interviews were carried out by TI national chapters and by ODI with selected humanitarian agency staff and with key individuals in a number of countries that have experienced natural disasters or civil conflict (Bangladesh, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Burundi, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Niger, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, and Zambia). The interviews were intended to check whether the concept and main elements of the risk map framework reflect the realities of those emergency contexts. They also sought specific examples of corruption in humanitarian assistance and elicited suggestions of how to prevent or counter such practices. In parallel, TI compiled information from other sources of possible tools and tactics that could be used to decrease the risk of corruption in humanitarian assistance.

Mapping the Risks of Corruption in Humanitarian Assistance examines the risk of corruption in humanitarian action and lays out where different risks may occur within the complex system of delivery and contracts that form the basis of humanitarian assistance.

Breaking down typical models of assistance by laying out the various elements of the process in tabular form, the report maps where various types of corruption exist along with the key components of such risks, in order to understand the opportunities and incentives for corrupt practices.

The report aims to:

• allow the development of more specific corruption risk maps for particular contexts
• point to the various types of tools and methods necessary in order to minimise corruption

Once risks have been identified, the measures or systems that could counter them can be reviewed and evaluated, gaps pinpointed and improvements considered. This framework differs from a programme audit in that it endeavours to anticipate and thus prevent potential corruption, rather than detecting it after the fact. The risk map shows only where vulnerabilities may lie. It does not indicate areas where corruption always occurs.

The report covers many contexts and types of humanitarian responses, based upon the perceptions and experiences of the authors and a small number of surveyed humanitarian practitioners. The research did not take an in-depth look at specific examples of corruption, but sought to identify as many of the risks as possible. The goal was to develop a widely applicable, generic map of corruption risks, because corruption is a sensitive and difficult-to-research topic.

An all-encompassing map that identifies so many risks may misleadingly give a disheartening impression of humanitarianism. The risk map shows only areas at risk of corruption. It is not an indication that corruption will always occur there.

Not all of the risks identified in the report would occur in any single relief programme. The likelihood, gravity and impact of a particular corrupt practice would vary from one emergency situation to another. However, since the focus of this exercise is to identify all potential corruption risks in order to determine ways to prevent or reduce them, the report is as comprehensive as possible.

Corruption can involve all parties to the relief process at various stages, including:

• donor agencies
• international humanitarian assistance agencies
• national or local partner organisations
• national or local authorities
• national or local elites and power groups
• corporations and suppliers
• beneficiaries of humanitarian assistance

Guatemala:
Acción Ciudadana, a TI national chapter in formation, signed with the Guatemalan government the Integrity and Access to Information Governmental Agreement on the National Reconstruction Programme Execution. This measure assures that the government will provide easier, broader and unrestricted access to public information. Accountability actions are being promoted to contribute to transparency in the use of resources in the reconstruction following Hurricane Stan.

Acción Ciudadana developed a social audit on the reconstruction, with the goal of an independent transparency evaluation on expenditures and public investment. The main strategy will be to build the capacity of society to monitor reconstruction through departmental networks and social municipal audit commissions led by the affected communities.

For more information, see the website of Acción Ciudadana.

Lebanon: The Lebanese Transparency Association (LTA)
Reconstruction in post-war Lebanon gave birth to a new wave of efforts in rehabilitating the war-torn country. Mismanagement and short-sightedness were omnipresent and the reconstruction process has thus been riddled with corruption scandals that have not only discouraged foreign investors but have also had a pervasive effect on the national economy.

In 2005, LTA published a report that features experiences from Lebanon, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sierra Leon. Moreover, it suggests nine “Integrity Principles” for post-war reconstruction largely based on emphasizing local knowledge and capacity and on controlling and monitoring the post-war spending imperative by international donors. LTA’s latest research project on corruption in post-war reconstruction countries, a comparative study looking at the experiences of Lebanon, Sierra Leone, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Palestine, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Mozambique and Timor-Leste, has been suspended due to current fighting in Lebanon.

For more information about LTA’s work see TI Lebanon in Post-Conflict reconstruction or visit the website at: www.transparency-lebanon.org

Pakistan:
TI and its national chapter convened a workshop to support transparency measures and curb the risk of corruption, mismanagement and waste in the country’s reconstruction efforts. Held in Islamabad on 7-8 February 2006, the event was opened by H.E. Shaukat Aziz, Prime Minister of Pakistan. It brought together participants from key government agencies, donors and civil society, as well as international experts in disaster relief. The discussions built on lessons learned from previous natural disasters - including the tsunami and the Gujarat earthquake. It followed an April 2005 regional meeting on corruption prevention in tsunami relief organised by TI with the Asian Development Bank and OECD's Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia and the Pacific.

The workshop produced concrete recommendations for a framework of good practice and stakeholder responsibilities. The recommendations focused on the importance of participatory decision making, transparency and monitoring of aid flows, monitoring and evaluation of procurement and service delivery, and effective enforcement and complaint-handling mechanisms.

Read the draft conclusions and recommendations for action.

For more information, see the website of Transparency International Pakistan.

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